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Abstract 
Wages, work intensity and unemployment in Japan, UK and US 
Julia Darby, Robert Hart, Michela Vecchi 
This paper focuses on the impact of excess labour supply on wage inflation in Japan, the US and the 
UK. We extend the usual analysis to incorporate the impact of excess supply within the firm.  
 
Our estimated wage equations provide some support for the widely held view that the US labour 
market is inherently more “flexible” than that in Japan or the UK.  In particular, US wages respond 
quickly to information internal to the firm (and with a lag to outside labour market conditions). 
However, whilst measured unemployment has no impact on Japan’s wage inflation, the ultimate 
response of wages to internal work intensity is estimated to be twice that in the US. Our UK results 
are more tentative, suggesting that both unemployment and work intensity matter, though their 
impact has evolved over time. Our key conclusions are that work intensity is an important factor in 
determining wage inflation, and that results based on recorded unemployment rates alone seriously 
underestimate the flexibility of real wages.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Theoretical and empirical work on relationships between wages and unemployment has been 
dominated by a restrictive interpretation of the latter variable.  Unemployment is measured in terms 
of officially registered unemployed persons expressed as a proportion of the total active labour 
force. This is a perfectly adequate way to proceed if we accept that there is more or less constant 
work intensity among those in employment.  But we know that work intensity within firms cannot 
generally be regarded as constant.  Throughout major industrialised economies, the general 
observation is that hourly productivity varies pro-cyclically (Hart and Malley, 1999) and a range of 
labour market theories have been devised to underpin this stylized fact.  Theories of labour hoarding 
have been especially prominent.  Variations in productivity suggest that gaps occur between actual 
and potential output.  Where actual hourly output is less than potential output at current prices then 
the associated internal 'excess supply' of labour is no less real than that externally available on the 
outside market.  Moreover, this excess supply may negatively interact with the wage as parties 
agree to dampen wage growth in order to minimise costly separations.   
 
Thirty years ago, Taylor (1970) established for the US labour market that adopting a more general 
measure of excess labour supply that embraces concepts of work intensity and worker 
discouragement1 has a potentially fundamental impact on the study of wage-unemployment 
relationships (see also Vanderkamp, 1973).  Since that time, the main thrust of the 'unemployment 
debate' has proceeded along the more restricted route of the claimant count. This almost certainly 
arises from the fact that the rate of registered unemployment is a socially and politically more 
sensitive variable than the degree of work intensity within firms.  The problem is that by ignoring 
excess labour supply on firms' intensive margins, empirical estimates of extensive margin effects 
may be distorted and thereby misleading. 
                                                          
1.  We do not consider worker discouragement, or so-called 'hidden' unemployment, here.  In preliminary investigations 
we used a number of proxy measures of discouragement, all of which were quantitaively most significant in Japan 
during the 1970s.  However, hidden unemployment was not found to have any significant effect in wage 
determination. 
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This paper re-visits the important arguments raised by Taylor.  We extend the earlier analysis in 
three ways.  First, we motive the approach by means of a simple Nash bargaining model.  Second, 
our econometric methodology deals more generally with short-run dynamics and long-run effects.  
Third, our empirical work is undertaken for Japan, UK and USA, each of which represents a 
different magnitude and direction of the problem of omitting work intensity. 
 
We demonstrate that observed wage-unemployment interactions are better understood when both 
external and internal labour supply features are embraced.  Like Taylor, we find for the US that 
both extensive (external) and intensive (internal) measures of unemployment add to our 
understanding of the wage-unemployment relationship.  For Japan, the omission of the intensive 
margin is much more serious since it provides the most important source of excess supply.  In the 
case of the U.K. there is a significant stretch of time when the extensive margin matters most and 
one where the intensive margin is of uppermost importance. 
 
In section 1 we provide estimates of total unemployment in the three countries, broken down into 
'hoarded' and claimant-count components.  Section 2 presents a simple bargaining model in which 
we derive a wage equation that includes work intensity and unemployment as two of its explanatory 
variables. Section 3 introduces the methodology used in the empirical analysis. Results are 
presented and discussed in section 4.   Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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1. Measuring unemployment to account for work intensity 
 
What impact does variations in work intensity have on externally-based measures of 
unemployment?  In order to gain an insight into this question, we adopt a standard trend-through-
peaks approach (e.g. Fair, 1985) to obtain an estimate of the former variable.  It is assumed that the 
workforce is fully utilised at peak points in the time series of productivity, measured as output per 
worker.2  Let Y denote output and N denote number of workers.  Interpolating such peaks and 
comparing these points of maximum potential productivity (Y/N)* with actual productivity (Y/N) 
provides a measure of excess labour for each time period. Specifically labour hoarding at time t, ht,  
is given by: 
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Whilst recorded unemployment, or the claimant count, can be used to identify under utilisation at 
the extensive margin, hoarding offers a measure of underutilisation of labour at the intensive 
margin. The resulting estimates of hoarding and “total” unemployment (recorded + hoarded) are 
shown in Figure 1 for the period 1960 – 1997. 
  
There are three main features of these results.  First, in all three countries, there are significant 
periods of time during which excess supply of workers within firms comprised a significant part of 
total unemployment. See, for example, the period immediately after the first oil shock in the mid 
1970s. Secondly, there is evidence - especially in the cases of the UK and USA - that hoarded 
unemployment was quantitatively more important pre-1985. In the case of the UK, reduced 
hoarding in more recent times may well reflect the general drive for more flexible labour markets, 
as stressed by Thatcher and later governments.  Thirdly, over the entire period, internal excess 
                                                          
2 Output per worker is used here in order to construct Figure 1.  Strictly, output per hour is the more appropriate 
measure.  In our main empirical work, estimates based on hourly productivity and hourly work intensity are also 
provided. 
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labour supply represents a much larger share of total unemployment in Japan than in the other two 
economies. Typically, significant variation in work intensity in Japan is linked to the view that a 
low transaction cost environment helps to stimulate high per-capita human capital investments and 
that the resulting rent sharing limits the degree of worker-firm separations (Hashimoto, 1979; Aoki, 
1988). 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
MEASURED UNEMPLOYMENT AND TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
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UNR = registered unemployment, T = total unemployment 
 
 
 
In general, the quantitative importance of excess labour within firms, coupled with inter-country 
differences in incidence of the two rates, support the objective of integrating work intensity into the 
analysis of wages and unemployment. Towards this end, we start by presenting a simple bargaining 
model. 
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2. A bargaining model 
Our intention here is to provide a simple bargaining model that aims to motivate our approach to 
wage estimation.  Consider a Nash bargain between a 'representative' firm and its union.  The 
parties jointly set wages in order to maximise a weighted average of the union’s utility and the 
firm’s profit.  For simplicity, we concentrate on joint bargaining with respect to the wage.  We do 
not attempt to say anything about employment setting.  The level of employment is a given variable 
to the bargainers.  We might imagine that employment contracts cover a longer time horizon than 
wage agreements and that the wage bargaining agenda does not embrace longer-term employment 
consequences of short-term wage setting.3   
 
The parties' joint objective is represented by 
 
(1)  γγ −Π=Ω 1)()(max U  
where U is the union’s utility function and Π is the firm’s profits and γ is the union's relative 
bargaining power. 
 
The union’s utility is a function of the negotiated wage, the alternative wage and the level of 
employment: 
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where 
P
W  is the bargained wage,
P
W  is the outside wage, B is unemployment benefit, )u(φ is the 
probability of being unemployed, N is employment and b is an index of the intensity of work. We 
assume that short-run changes in b are exogenous.  Johnson (1990) provides a generalisation in 
which the joint bargain also includes intensity of work.  
                                                          
3 In a dynamic context, we might imagine that wages and work intensity adjust more speedily than employment to 
changes in economic variables.  Impediments to employment adjustment might include human capital considerations, 
legislative impediments and industrial relations' issues. 
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The firm’s profit function is given by 
(3)  Π = −PY W
P
N  
where Y is total output produced by the firm.  Output in the short run is a function of the number of 
workers and their work intensity, b, or   
 
(4)  Y = F(bN). 
 
Maximising (1) with respect to the wage, we obtain the following expression: 
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γ  
 
where ω  is defined as 
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Equating the inside and outside wage, we can rewrite (6) as 
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where R is the replacement ratio. Now we substitute (7) and (3) into (5) and we solve for the wage 
rate to obtain 
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Log-linearising equation (8), gives us the final specification that is used in the empirical analysis: 
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Note that equation (9) can also be derived in terms of the total number of hours worked instead of 
the number of workers. In that case we have hourly wages as the dependent variable and hourly 
productivity on the right hand side. In section 4 we present results for both specifications.  
 
3. Estimation 
We have estimated wage equations based on (9) for the US, Japan and the UK using quarterly data 
over the period 1968-1996.  The equations take the form of dynamic error correction models where 
(9) represents the long-run influences on the real wage. This approach is common in the literature 
and essentially follows Darby and Wren-Lewis (1991). The dependent variable is the change in the 
log of the real product wage, dw. We have allowed for data determined dynamics in price inflation, 
to reflect nominal inertia i.e. the slow catch up in nominal wages to changes in inflation (these 
terms are denoted ddpy). There are further dynamics in past wage inflation dw(-j) and in work 
intensity, din(-j). The levels variables reflect those included in (9). Trend productivity is included, 
pr(-j), to capture the term PY/N. Work intensity, b in the theoretical model, is denoted in(-j) and it is 
proxied by h-1, that is the inverse of labour hoarding (as defined on page 4). The unemployment rate 
is denoted u(-j). The replacement ratio, R, was statistically insignificant is our equations and hence 
does not feature in the empirical results4.  
The final specifications reported in tables 1 and 2 reflect the outcome of a general-to-specific 
search. The implied long-run solutions, which relate directly to equation (9), are reported in Table 
3. All data are from the OECD Business Sector database and are constructed so as to be comparable 
across countries. 
 
                                                          
4 This variable is notoriously hard to measure appropriately. We have tried to work with data constructed on a 
comparable basis for the OECD Jobs Study, but this is only available on a biennial basis. The information content of the 
series is probably low, and there is no measure of the strictness with which benefit eligibility criteria are applied. We 
found R to be statistically insignificant in our equations. 
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As mentioned in the previous section, two specifications of equation 9 will be used in the empirical 
analysis. The first is a worker-based and the second is an hour based equation. The second one is an 
hours-based equation. One reason for looking at the hourly specification is that our hours data takes 
into account part-time and overtime work, as well as normal hours (O’Mahony 1999). The 
importance of part-time work in Japan and the increasing importance of part-time employment in 
the UK can affect the wage-unemployment relationship. 
 
4. Results 
Tables 1 and 2 contain our estimates of the specifications outlined above. They are delineated, 
respectively, by workers- and hours-based measures of productivity and work intensity.  In general, 
we find that measurement of productivity and work intensity on an hourly basis, rather than per 
worker, has an impact on the Japanese and UK results but makes little difference in the case of the 
US.  Table 3 contains the estimated long run coefficients on productivity, unemployment and work 
intensity arising from these worker and hours equations. 
(a) Long-run relationships 
The long-run coefficients shown in Table 3 are derived from the results in Tables 1 and 2: they are 
the estimates after full dynamic adjustments have been allowed for. Work intensity plays a 
significant role in both Japan and the United States. We obtain similar long-run positive 
associations with the wage in terms of the worker equations.  In the hours' dimension, however, the 
Japanese coefficient is twice as large as its equivalent in the US.  These latter findings are consistent 
with existing Japanese evidence that (a) hours are an important consideration in measures of 
internal excess labour supply and (b) Japanese internal excess supply is a comparatively large 
phenomenon (Odagiri, 1992; Hart and Malley, 1996; Vecchi, 2000).  By contrast, work intensity is 
weakest and least well determined in the UK; in fact, in the hourly based results in Table 2 there is 
only a temporary positive effect of work intensity on the level of wages. 
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The key contribution to the intensive margin in the wage determination process in Japan is 
underscored by the finding of no significant unemployment effects on the wage in that economy.5  
In the US, there is strong evidence that both work intensity and unemployment affect wages. 
Therefore, the original findings of Taylor (1970) are supported in our data set. 
Two other long-run observations are worth reporting. First, we note that real wages are unaffected 
by inflation in all three countries. The second relates to productivity, and supports an advantage of 
the hours' based results.  Strictly speaking, our simple model implies a unity coefficient on 
productivity (see equation (8)). This follows from the simple form of the profit function.  Yet, the 
equivalent long-run result for Japan suggests that wages will rise by only 0.55% for every 1% gain 
in productivity. The equivalent elasticity in the case of the US is over 0.8% while in the UK is 
unity.  Using an hourly based measure of productivity raises the Japanese elasticity to 0.78. 
 
(b) Short-run relationships 
In a shorter-term perspective, there is evidence in Tables 1 and 2 of contrasting dynamic 
adjustments.  
 
The fastest adjustment of real wages to target occurs in the US.  This might seem surprising in the 
context of an economy in which wage contracts are typically set for up to 3 years ahead.  However, 
we note that the equation implies that contracting will be based upon expected or trend productivity, 
expected inflation and unemployment.  The US estimates are consistent with their being little by 
way of inflation or productivity surprises.  The estimates relating to work intensity suggest that 
current and last quarter work intensity matter to current real wages. The unemployment effect is 
slower in the sense that u(-2) is clearly dominant in tests of the appropriate lag structure.  Wages 
                                                          
5 Adding lagged unemployment, or alternatively, up to three lags in unemployment to the Japanese equation can easily 
be reject on the basis of standard t and F tests, with probability values t  = .700 and F  = .652 respectively.  Moreover, 
inclusion of these unemployment terms has no impact on the size or significance of the other parameters. 
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respond quickly to information internal to the firm and with a lag to conditions in the labour market 
as a whole. 
 
Japan shows more sluggish adjustment of wages. There is evidence of nominal inertia, in the sense 
that real wages react to changes in inflation with a lag.  The coefficient on w(-1) indicates that 
wages adjust to their long-run target level at a slower rate in Japan than in the other countries.  The 
hourly equation specification in Japan has some attraction over the alternative.  The coefficient on 
the level of the real wage is larger and attracts greater significance. This provides stronger evidence 
in favour of the error correction formulation. 
 
For the UK, the switch from per worker to per hour results in the loss of a significant level effect 
from work intensity on wages.  Although it is notable that neither UK equation is particularly well 
specified.  CUSUM and CUSUMSQ plots clearly indicate some problems of instability which may 
also be behind the strong evidence of significant ARCH (4) effects.  
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Table 1: Worker-based wage equations 
Sample Period 1968:1 - 1996:4, 116 Quarterly Observations. 
Dependent variable is dw, estimation is by OLS. 
 
 JAPAN UNITED STATES UNITED KINGDOM 
intercept  
ddpy 
ddpy(-1) 
ddpy(-2) 
dw(-1) 
din 
w(-1) 
pr(-1) 
in(-1) 
in(-3) 
u(-1) 
u(-2) 
 0.1619 (.016) 
-0.4803 (.076) 
-0.4241 (.100) 
-0.2411 (.076) 
-0.3117 (.073) 
- 
-0.0755 (.016) 
 0.0418 (.017) 
 0.1498 (.057) 
- 
- 
- 
 0.1485 (.038) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 0.3669 (.050) 
-0.1582 (.042) 
 0.1283 (.037) 
 0.1571 (.033) 
- 
- 
-0.4526 (.207) 
 0.0032 (.003)   
-0.4107 (.058) 
- 
- 
 0.3167 (.068) 
 0.4339 (.035) 
-0.1248 (.068) 
 0.1248 * 
- 
 0.0753 (.063) 
-0.2977 (.100) 
- 
Rbar2 
F 
Unit 
LM1 
LM4 
LM8 
HET 
ARCH1 
ARCH4 
RESET 
NORM 
 0.7422  
F (9,106) 37.78 [.000] 
t(106)   9.341 [.000] 
F(1,105)  0.163 [.687] 
F(4,102) 0.178 [.949] 
F(8, 98) 0.335 [.951] 
F(1,114) 0.045 [.832] 
F(1,105) 0.001 [.975] 
F(4,102) 0.289 [.885] 
F(1,105) 0.911 [.342] 
Chi-Sq(2) 2.212 [.331] 
 0.3848  
F(5,110) 15.39 [.000] 
t(110)  3.592 [.000] 
F(1,109) 2.351 [.128] 
F(4,106) 0.994 [.414] 
F(8,102) 0.677 [.710] 
F(1,114) 4.207 [.043] 
F(1,109) 1.999 [.160] 
F(4,106) 1.589 [.183] 
F(1,109) 0.818 [.368] 
Chi-Sq(2) 2.042 [.360]
 0.6771  
F(10,105) 25.12 [.000] 
t(102)  1.074 [.285] 
F(1,104) 0.064 [.800] 
F(4,101) 1.208 [.312] 
F(8,97)  2.060 [.047] 
F(1,114) 0.018 [.894] 
F(1,104) 0.753 [.388] 
F(4,101) 5.555 [.000] 
F(1,104) 0.394 [.532] 
Chi-Sq(2) 1.434 [.488] 
       
w - real compensation per worker Unit        – test of unit long-run coefficient on pr 
pr - trend productivity LM1,4,8  – Lagrange Multiplier tests for serial correlation 
u - unemployment rate HET       – test of heteroscedasticity based on squared residuals 
in - work intensity ARCH1,4– test of autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
py - value added deflator RESET   – Ramsey RESET test of functional form 
d - first difference operator NORM    – Jarque Bera test of residual normality 
dd - second difference operator  
All variables are in logs.  
 
Note. 
The Japanese equation incorporates two (0, 1,-1,0) dummy variables for the period following the 1973 oil 
shock.  The UK equation incorporates similar (0,1,-1,0) dummy variables to capture the temporary effects of 
the 1973 oil shock, the three day week in 1974:2 and the catch-up effects following the removal of incomes 
policy in 1975.  The estimated coefficients attached to these dummies are not reported to preserve space.  
Exclusion of the dummy variables results in rejection of the null hypothesis that the equation residuals are 
normally distributed.  
The absence of a standard error on coefficient on the trend productivity, pr, in the UK equation reflects the 
fact that a unit long-run coefficient has been imposed, and as noted under “Unit” in the table, this restriction 
is data consistent. 
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Table 2: Hours-based wage equations 
 
 JAPAN UNITED STATES UNITED KINGDOM  
 
intercept 
ddpy 
ddpy(-1) 
ddpy(-2) 
dw(-1) 
din 
w(-1) 
pr(-1) 
in(-1)  
in(-3)  
u(-1) 
u(-2) 
 0.1356 (.013) 
-0.4815 (.074)  
-0.4463 (.096) 
-0.2450 (.071) 
-0.3139 (0.64) 
- 
-0.1234 (0.06) 
 0.0968 (.016) 
 0.2213 (.044) 
- 
- 
 0.1426 (.030) 
 - 
 - 
 - 
 - 
 0.3544 (.053) 
-0.1636 (.042) 
 0.1355 (.007) 
 0.1457 (.051) 
 - 
 - 
-0.5458 (.002) 
 0.0038 (.003) 
-0.4028 (.058) 
- 
- 
 0.3412 (.068) 
 0.4572 (.064) 
-0.1391 (.033) 
 0.1391 
- 
- 
-0.3589 (.102) 
- 
Rbar2 
F 
Unit 
LM1 
LM4 
LM8 
HET 
ARCH1 
ARCH4 
RESET 
NORM 
 0.7538 
F(9,106) 40.13 [.000] 
t(106)  9.246 [.000] 
F(1,105) 0.804 [.372] 
F(4,102) 0.440 [.779] 
F(8,98)  0.622 [.758] 
F(1,1 14) 5.480 [.021] 
F(1,105) 0.008 [.930] 
F(4,102) 0.272 [.896] 
F(1, 1 05) 6.189 [.014] 
Chi-Sq(2) 0.243 [.243] 
 0.3858 
F(5,110) 15.45 [.000] 
t(110)  4.310 [.000] 
F(1,109) 2.137 [.147] 
F(4,106) 0.796 [.531] 
F(8,102) 0.545 [.820] 
F(1, 1 14) 1.982 [.162] 
F(1, 1 09) 1.262 [.264] 
F(4,106) 0.893 [.471] 
F(1,109) 0.964 [.328] 
Chi-Sq(2) 1.695 [.428] 
 0.6898 
F (9,106) 27.46 [.000] 
t(106)  1.333 [.186] 
F(1,105) 0.205 [.651] 
F(4,102) 1.355 [.255] 
F(8, 98) 2.184 [.035] 
F(1,114) 0.043    [.835] 
F(1,105) 0.731 [.395] 
F(4,102) 6.259 [.000] 
F(1,105) 0.057 [.812] 
Chi-Sq(2) 1.457 [.483] 
    
w - real compensation per hour 
pr - trend productivity 
u - unemployment rate 
in - work intensity 
py - value added deflator. 
d - first difference operator 
dd - second difference operator 
All variables are in logs. 
Note: dummy variables are included in the Japanese and UK equations and the unit long-run coefficient on 
trend productivity is imposed in the UK equation as in Table 1. 
 
Table 3: Estimated long-run coefficients 
Implied long-run relationship in levels: w = constant + α pr + β ur + γ in 
 
 JAPAN UNITED STATES UNITED KINGDOM 
 
 
α 
β 
γ 
(A)  (B) 
0.554  0.784 
   -     - 
0.984  1.796 
 (A)    (B) 
 0.811  0.828 
-2.868 -3.337 
 0.933  0.890 
 (A)   (B) 
 1.000  1.000 
-2.385 -2.578 
 0.603     - 
Note: (A) derive from the worker-based results in Table 1. 
         (B) derive from the hours-based results in Table 2. 
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5. Conclusions 
The paper has analysed the implications for wage determination, of adopting a more general 
measure of the excess labour supply in US, UK and Japan. In all three countries, there are 
significant periods of time during which excess supply of workers within firms comprised a 
significant part of total unemployment. The different patterns reflect differences in labour market 
institutions across countries and through time. For example, factors like a more flexible labour 
market in the UK after the Thatcher period or the comparatively higher labour hoarding in Japan are 
picked up by our excess labour supply measure.  
 
We show results for both worker-based and (total) hours-based equations. This enables us to 
account for some of the institutional differences across countries (for example, the prevalence of 
part-time employment in the UK and in Japan).  We find that hourly-based measures of productivity 
and work intensity have a stronger impact in Japan, while they make little difference in the US. 
Estimates of the long-run coefficients show that there is a positive correlation between wages and 
work intensity in all three countries. Such correlation is particularly strong in Japan when the hours-
based wage equation is estimated. This reflects the higher propensity of Japanese firms to hold 
excess labour over the business cycle. In the UK and the US, we find strong and negative effects of 
the standard unemployment rate on wages. This contrasts with Japan where no effects are found.  
 
There are three main comparative findings on the short-run dynamic adjustments in the countries.  
First, the US shows a faster wage adjustment to the other two countries. Second, the hours-
specification is better determined for Japan.  Third, the UK results allow us to offer only some 
tentative conclusions: both recorded unemployment and internal work intensity impact on wage 
inflation, but their impact has evolved over time. In general, it appears that the relative contributions 
of inside and outside excess supply influences in the UK are more complex to evaluate, and more 
work is needed in this respect.  At least, our evidence points to the fact that excess supply effects on 
wages within firms should be accommodated in future UK work on wage determination. 
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Finally, this paper has emphasised the importance of accounting for other measures of excess 
supply on the labour market. Results based on the recorded unemployment rates can seriously 
underestimate actual labour market wage responses. We believe that this is an area that deserves 
further attention.  
 
This work should be regarded as a prototype for more advanced approaches. A number of 
extensions to this work might well produce significant value added.  There are two obvious 
candidates.  First, hoarding might be treated as an endogenous variable by incorporating work 
intensity in the firm-union bargaining agenda.  Second, on the econometric side, [Julia/Michela] 
16 
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17 
This paper looks at wage inflation in the UK, the US and Japan. We focus in particular on the 
impact of excess labour supply. Rather than measuring excess supply of labour purely in terms of 
registered unemployment, we extend the usual analysis to look at the impact of excess supply of 
workers within the firm.  As is well known, firms may 'hoard', or under utilise, labour which 
effectively means that, internally, more hours are supplied than demanded at given wages.  Our key 
conclusion is that results based on recorded unemployment rates alone seriously underestimate the 
flexibility of real wages.    
 
This extension is important, since both over time and across countries, there is considerable 
variation in internal utilisation of labour. As figure 1 shows, measured unemployment presents a 
particularly poor measure of the true extent of the under utilisation of labour in Japan. The 
prevalence of labour hoarding in this economy is well known. The decreased incidence of internal 
under utilisation is less well documented in the case of the UK and the US (again see Figure 1).  
 
Our results provide some support for the widely held view that the US labour market is inherently 
more “flexible” than that in Japan or the UK.  In particular, US wages respond quickly to 
information internal to the firm while there is a response lag to conditions in the outside labour 
market. In Japan, whilst unemployment has no impact on wage inflation, the ultimate response of 
wages to internal work intensity is estimated to be twice the size of that in the US.  From the UK 
perspective, we are able to offer more tentative conclusions. Both recorded unemployment and 
internal work intensity impact on wage inflation, but there their impact has evolved over time. In 
general, it appears that the relative contributions of inside and outside excess supply influences in 
the UK are more complex to evaluate, and more work is needed in this respect.  At least, our 
evidence points to the fact that excess supply effects on wages within firms should be 
accommodated in future UK work on wage determination. 
